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Abstract: Compact city policy is central to current metropolitan strategic planning, yet higher density
housing in existing urban areas has been subject to significant resident opposition. This has put new
focus on the extent and nature of resident influence over planning processes. There are a variety of
policy positions in relation to resident input in planning processes within and across jurisdictions in
Australia and overseas. However, there is limited research exploring the effectiveness of these
different planning approaches in terms of housing supply or participatory planning outcomes.
Drawing on data collected in Melbourne, this paper synthesises the results of a research project
conducted for the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI) exploring the impacts of
third party opposition on housing supply and participatory planning approaches in relation to higherdensity and social housing (Cook et al 2012a, 2012b). This paper focuses explicitly on the planning
implications of this work and develops a new comparison of three dominant planning approaches in
the management of resident opposition: reactive participation; bypassing participation; and proactive
participation. Using a mixed methods approach that integrates metropolitan-wide planning permit
activity with site-specific case studies and stakeholder interviews, we explore characteristics of these
participation models and implications for compact city policy and participatory planning. The paper
contributes a metropolitan-scale understanding of resident engagement in the delivery of higher
density housing. We find significant limitations in the ability of existing development assessment to
balance the delivery of compact city outcomes with participatory planning goals.

Introduction
The shift to compact city planning policy over recent decades, along with the increase in demand for
higher density housing (HDH), has led to increased development in existing urban areas of Australia’s
major capital cities. While the redevelopment of existing areas with HDH is not new, the scale of
redevelopment is. Melbourne’s high-rise capital city zone (comprising Docklands and parts of
Southbank) is one expression of this; while suburbanisation of densification is another (Cook et al
2013). Overall, compact-city led development of HDH is now dramatically changing many areas of
existing neighbourhoods.
While redevelopment is fuelled by market interests, it is enabled by the existing land-use policy
framework which in most Australian capital cities has developed in advance of private sector interest
to favour the provision of HDH in strategic areas over low density urban expansion. There are well
established policy objectives underpinning the provision of HDH in existing urban areas: urban
containment; better provision of well-located affordable housing; better integration of housing
development with existing urban infrastructure; and redevelopment of under utilised land. Yet resident
opposition to HDH highlights the potential conflicts between compact city policy objectives and
participatory planning principles. The urban consolidation stemming from compact city policy results in
significant change to some existing neighbourhoods; change which is typically seen by residents as
reducing local amenity, stressing local infrastructure, and de-valuing existing property. Compact city
policy also challenges preservationist elements of planning policy, such as protection of built form
heritage and notions of neighborhood character (see Woodcock et al 2009).
In this paper we examine the tensions between compact city policy and resident participation in
planning process, drawing on research funded by the Australian Housing and Urban Research
Institute (Cook et al 2012a, 2012b). The paper builds on previous work by focusing explicitly on the
planning processes at the centre of higher density housing and resident opposition. It also develops a
new comparison of three dominant planning approaches in relation to resident participation. It does so
by exploring development assessment pathways via an examination of development applications in
Melbourne, Victoria. We examine three different and distinct approaches to resident engagement with
land-use policy and development assessment in the context of HDH. These models are relevant
nationally and internationally, but have local significance in that they are all currently used within the
Victorian planning system. First we look at reactive participation, based on resident rights to object to,
and appeal, individual development proposals. This is the dominant development pathway in Victoria
where third party objection and appeal rights (TPOAR) are strong. Second we look at bypassing

participation, with fast-tracked development assessment which does not provide for resident objection
and appeal rights. There is an increasing trend toward this model in development assessment to avoid
difficulties and delays often attributed to TPOAR, particularly for larger housing developments in
1
existing urban areas . Finally we look at proactive participation, which places a deliberate focus on
resident engagement in local land-use policy formation. This model is often presented as a desirable
middle road, allowing for resident participation but reducing pressure on development assessment.
The research combines analysis of planning permit activity data with detailed case studies of particular
developments. In the paper, we first discuss the policy and development context, before outlining the
research approach. We then examine the three policy approaches in detail before concluding by
discussing the implications of these different policy settings for compact city and participatory
planning.

Research Approach
There is significant tension between objectives underpinning compact city and the objectives of
participatory planning. Despite this, there is limited research in Australia that examines resident
engagement in development assessment decision-making with regard to HDH. The research utilises
a mixed method approach, drawing on qualitative case studies and quantitative analysis of permit
activity data in Melbourne Victoria. The quantitative analysis is founded on a purpose built dataset
created to examine development assessment process (see Figure 1). The dataset covers residential
planning permit activity across all Melbourne Local Government Areas (LGAs) for 2009-10 and
contains a total of 15,676 permit applicators. For each application it documents the specific planning
policy provisions, key development application characteristics, and the nature and extent of objection
and appeal. The data has been analysed using descriptive statistics to reveal patterns and trends,
including comparison with social-economic indicators; GIS to reveal spatial distribution; and regression
modeling to explore the combined potential influence of key factors on development application
pathways. To further explore the effectiveness of different development pathways, qualitative analysis
of development case studies was undertaken. Eighteen semi-structured interviews were conducted
with planners, developers and residents across three sites. Interview data was supported with an
analysis of the planning and development timelines associated with each case study.
Figure 1: Dataset design
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This trend will increase in Victoria, with recent planning reform further reducing the provision of TPOAR via
reformed zoning provisions (DTPLI 2013a) and a proposed fast-tracked permit assessment pathway (DTPLI
2013b). These reforms are progressively being rolled out from July 2013. The research reported on in this paper
deals with development prior to these new reforms.

Reactive Participation
TPOAR are a part of development approval processes in many Australian and overseas jurisdictions.
TPOAR are broadly acknowledged across the literature for their contribution to participatory planning
outcomes allowing public scrutiny of government process and locally situated development outcomes
(Hurley et al 2011). However, detractors criticise TPOAR as being adversarial rather than deliberative;
favouring engagement by elites; drawing focus and resources from other participatory planning styles;
and, via appeals processes, shifting development decision-making away from local determination
(Hurley et al 2011; Taylor 2013). In addition, the exercising of TPOAR can inhibit and delay planning
approval and development, impacting on development costs, developer confidence and housing
supply.

Analysis of permit activity data - reactive participation
The Victorian Planning and Environment Act 1987 includes provisions for residents to formally object
to development applications; and to appeal permit decisions to the Victorian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal (VCAT). Provision of TPOAR covers most development applications in Victoria. Figure 2
presents the spread of objections across the data set for applications with normal TPOAR. The
proportion of applications attracting objections increases significantly when we consider only known
larger developments (10+ dwellings), as do the number of cases attracting multiple objections. It is
these larger developments that are more specifically representative of HDH and compact city. The
number of objections is important to note as it is often a trigger for a permit application assessment,
which is usually conducted by a planning officer, to be taken before the elected Council who are more
likely to refuse a development application than planning officers (McRae & Hurley, forthcoming).
Figure 2: Permit applications subject to objection (% of applications with TPOAR)

While a significant minority of cases attracted objections, this conflict does not necessarily generate an
appeal of the permit decision. Across the data set, 7.1% of all applications proceeded to a VCAT
dispute. This is consistent with broader trends as reported by the Productivity Commission (2011).
Appeals can be lodged either by the developer (first party appeal against refusal of permit or of permit
conditions) or by an objector (third party appeal against granting of permit). VCAT hearings can also
result from a failure of the local council to determine a decision within the allowable timeframe (60
days), resulting in the application defaulting to a refusal from the local council.
To better understand the relationship between resident objection and appeals to VCAT, Figure 3
presents a breakdown of appeal types, in combination with the associated objection numbers. There

are several key implications. First, the vast majority of VCAT cases in the sample (97% of cases
where TPOAR provisions are known) occurred where there were normal TPOAR. In other words,
without TPOAR, there are rarely first party appeals. Second, all appeal types increase in likelihood
with the number of objections lodged, to the point where an appeal to VCAT was more likely than not
for applications with 10 or more objections. Third, appeals from third parties account for only 19% of
VCAT cases, a relatively small proportion given the extent of concern regarding the impact of third
party appeals in Victoria on development activity. Finally, first party appeals are the most common.
When combined with failure to determine cases, which also represent a first party appeal against a defacto refusal, they account for 58% of cases. The number of first party appeals closely correlated with
third party objection levels, with the number of cases increasing considerably when 10+ objections are
present. Therefore, first party appeals commonly reflect third party engagement and influence, via
objections, in the planning process.
Figure 3: VCAT appeal type, by number of objections.

Figures 4 and 5 show objections and appeals against indicators of socio-economic advantage (SEIFA
IRSD rankings). Applications have been ranked into five groups, with equal numbers of applications,
based on suburb SEIFA scores. Figure 4 shows that more advantaged areas object to development
more frequently. While the percentage of cases with 10 or more objections is significantly lower, the
skew to advantaged areas is more pronounced for highly contested developments. Given the
relationship between objection numbers and council assessment practice and outcome, this indicates
that developments in higher SEIFA areas are facing more effective community resistance, either by
greater propensity for individuals to object, or by organised resident mobilisation. Figure 5 shows the
relationship between VCAT appeals involving resident objectors and local area socio-economic
characteristics. The proportion of appeals increases with the level of advantage. Regression
modelling was used to further explore the potential influence of objection numbers and socioeconomic characteristic on permit application pathways (see Cook et al 2012). The quantitative
analysis points to an influence of area wealth and education in the distribution of objection and appeal.
One of our specific development case studies, in the LGA of Stonnington, further explores this effect,
highlighting stakeholder experiences of objection and appeal processes more broadly.

Figure 4: Applications with objections (%) by SEIFA quintile of suburb

Figure 5: VCAT cases with resident objection (% of cases) by SEIFA IRSD quintile

Case study of reactive participation – Stonnington
This case study concerns a proposal for a large apartment complex on a vacant site in the LGA of
Stonnington. Stonnington is a highly advantaged area within Melbourne, ranked in the top quintile of
the Socio-Economic Index for Areas (SEIFA). The quantitative data reveals a high rate of objection
and appeal to development applications relative to other Melbourne LGAs.
The development site was adjacent to a business zone, but zoned residential 1, and therefore subject
to TPOAR. The development proposal attracted a significant level of third party objection. The initial
proposal prompted coordinated resident mobilisation, generating over 260 objections and raising
approximately $170,000 to support opposition. In this case, four permit applications ended up in
hearings at VCAT over a six year period. In two of these, councilors went against the planning officers’
recommendation to grant a permit, in effect supporting the resident objectors. Even though VCAT
granted permits in three out of four hearings, many of the concerns of residents were addressed
through the appeal process, including the sinking of the car park below ground, height reductions and
a higher proportion of larger apartments. Despite these modifications, the proponent still achieved
permits for the construction of 187 dwellings, the number initially proposed in the first permit
application.
This case raises a number of key issues regarding resident participation in development assessment
via TPOAR. First are the significant cost implications for both developers and residents. One of the
central arguments against TPOAR, particularly from the development community, is that they
unnecessarily increase costs. In this case, the developer estimated the costs of delay to be around
$3m. What this case also reveals is the financial commitment of local communities, where there is a
capacity and a willingness to contribute, with local residents raising a ‘fighting fund’ of $170,000. This
leads to the second issue, that of equity of access to planning process. As one resident explains:
If this wasn’t as wealthy an area as it was, you’d never have been able to raise the money to
have had the long process here. I mean we just happen in the same kilometre block of this
site to have High Court Judges, bookies, you know, Sirs, Knights, barristers, QCs, people who
understood how important it was, but you know, if I’d just probably gone to Ashburton, I
probably could only have raised $10,000.
Raising a residents ‘fighting fund’ of this size would clearly not be possible in most suburbs. Therefore,
the characteristics of local residents (wealthy and knowledgeable) enabled extensive resident input
into decision-deliberation, firstly by influencing councilor deliberation at the local level, and secondly by
sending expert witnesses to VCAT appeals. As one local councilor reflects:
I find that groups of residents who are articulate, well organised, reasonable, are more
effective and get our ear. And that was a particularly well organised and articulate group.
The capacity for some groups to fund expert advisors and legal support is one of the long-standing
criticisms of TPOAR (Finkler 2006; Ellis 2002; Willey 2006). The findings from this case study support
the notion of a skew towards engagement by elites in the planning process.
The third issue raised by this case study is that of local deliberation, in particular politically informed
deliberation of councilors, versus deliberation at appeal. In this case it seems resident use of TPOAR
and subsequent deliberations at VCAT resolved planning outcomes in the absence of clear local
decision determinations. The case reveals that problems arise when state level policy intent is poorly
reflected in local policy or decision-making practice. As one resident explains, the process of appeal
was seen in some ways as inevitable:
I mean you start off with that ridiculous yellow notice and it just goes on from there and you
end up at VCAT.
Overall it is notable that residents regarded the planning process in this case as reasonable. There
was frustration with the time taken to resolve the case and some disappointment that the development
proceeded. However, there was general satisfaction with the outcome and an acknowledgement of the
legal basis on which the outcomes were founded. Many elements of the case suggest that stronger,
clearer planning controls would have improved the housing supply outcomes while improving the
participatory outcomes achieved.

Bypassing Participation
While TPOAR are enshrined in the Victorian Planning and Environment Act 1987, there exists a
variety of mechanisms within the act to exempt TPOAR. These fast tracking mechanisms are
summarised in Table 1. There are four basic types of fast-tracking: the provisions of the land-use
zone; land-use overlays; designating specific sites via the planning scheme as having the Minister for
Planning as responsible authority; and ministerial ‘call-in’ of projects. The first three are based on
clauses in local planning schemes and are therefore known at the time of development application; the

last type involves intervention during the development application process. The result is a complex
array of differing requirements and exemptions for permits and for the provision of TPOAR on housing
developments.
Table 1: Fast-tracking planning mechanisms for housing in Victoria
Broad Type

Specific Mechanism

Particulars

Zoning*

Priority Development
Zone

Schedules to the zone may specify exemption
from TPOAR, typically where applications are
deemed in accordance with an approved local
area plan.

Comprehensive
Development Zone

Schedules to the zone may specify exemption
from TPOAR, typically where applications are
deemed in accordance with an approved local
area plan.

Residential 2 Zone

Applications for medium and high-density
housing are exempt from TPOAR, where
consistent with design guidelines.

Business Zones 1,2
and 5.

Application exempt from TPOAR unless within
30m of residential zone, education facility or
hospital.

Incorporated Plan
Overlay, Development
Plan Overlay

Applications exempt from TPOAR if generally in
accordance with an overall site plan.

Design Development
Overlay

Schedule may specify that applications are
exempt from TPOAR if in accordance with
design guidelines.

Overlays

Responsible Authority Clause 61,01 of the
– planning scheme
planning scheme

The planning scheme can specify that the
Minister is the responsible authority for specific
sites or development types. The minister is not
required to follow normal TPOAR processes.

Responsible authority
– call-ins, deferrals
and panels.

Called in applications

The Minister may call in permit applications for
assessment. The minister is not required to
follow normal TPOAR processes.

Deferred applications

The local council may request that an application
be assessed by the Minister or a panel
appointed by the Minister.

Nation-Building
Stimulus applications

Clause 52.41 added to the planning scheme
makes social housing projects under the NationBuilding program exempt from TPOAR, with the
Minister for Planning as approval authority.
Expired June 2012.

*Note: Zones being progressively updated from July 2013

Analysis of permit activity data - bypassing participation
Figure 6 presents the extent of fast-tracking (defined as the removal of TPOAR) across our data set
and known major developments. It shows that across the dataset, the vast majority of permit
applications are subject to TPOAR (87%), with 7.1% fast-tracked. However, when examining larger
projects the proportion of fast-tracked developments increases, with developments of 25 or more
dwellings being fast tracked in 29.2% of cases. Therefore, while fast-tracking is limited, it happened
more often in the provision of HDH. The most prevalent mechanism associated with fast tracking is the
use of overlays to augment underlying zone provisions, with 87% of fast tracked developments
facilitated by overlay provisions. In 34% of developments the provisions of the zone removed TPOAR,
and 4% were subject to ministerial call-in.

Figure 6: Residential permit applications by TPOAR provision

\

Figure 7 shows the distribution of fast-tracked applications by SEIFA IRSD ranking of the suburb.
While there is a general skew evident to the lower three quintiles of SEIFA rankings, part of this
variation can be explained by the prominence of urban fringe growth in the fast-tracked applications.
Therefore, unlike the significant increase in objection and appeal in more advantaged areas, the fasttracking of development is less associated with SEIFA characteristics.
Figure 7: Fast-tracking by SEIFA quintile of suburb

To better understand the characteristics of such fast tracked approaches, and the experiences of key
stakeholders, we turn now to an examination of a specific case study development from the broader
data set.

Case study of bypassing participation – Moreland
The fast-tracked development examined in our research was in the inner-northern LGA of Moreland.
Moreland includes a mosaic of urban forms, from restructuring old industrial areas to low density
residential areas. While in the second bottom quintile of SEIFA, it has been subject to significant
gentrification in the areas closer to the city. Like Stonnington, the quantitative data reveals a high rate
of objection and appeal relative to other LGAs in Melbourne. The development, known as “The
Nicholson”, was a fast tracked project under the federal Social Housing Initiative (SHI) with special
legislation passed to remove TPOAR from SHI projects.
The site, adjacent to a main road and with significant public transport provision (tram, bus, rail) within
walking distance, had long been identified in local policy for strategic redevelopment. The
development proposal for 207 dwellings, easily the largest in the neighbourhood, incorporated leading
edge sustainability performance elements and construction techniques, as well as a significant
proportion of social housing (58 dwellings) and affordable rental units (38 dwellings), hence approval
under the SHI.
With the removal of TPOAR, there was no statutory obligation to notify residents of the proposed
development. Many residents only found out about the development when they received a letter from
the local federal Member of Parliament highlighting the development. Despite no formal avenues to
object, residents quickly mobilised in opposition, contacting neighbours, directly contacting local state
Members of Parliament, and raising exposure via the local press. Following sustained political
pressure from local members, the State Minister for Planning instructed the developer, contrary to the
amended planning provisions, and some months after planning permits were issued, to consult with
residents.
There are a number of key implications from this case regarding the removal of TPOAR to expedite
development. The first regards the nature of the fast-tracking process, and the abandonment of
notification once TPOAR was removed. This lack of communication with residents ultimately resulted
in significant community anger. As one resident explains:
The original outrage of everyone involved was ‘not knowing’’. The lack of process and the lack
of information and what felt like a really secret process, probably fired us up more than what
we were trying to deal with as a reality.
In fact, there was consensus between all those interviewed in this case (two developers, two planners
and three residents) that formal notification should not have been removed from the development
assessment process. The second issue to note is that the removal of TPOAR does not remove
resident opposition against development. An extensive and well organised mobilisation of residents
succeeded in changing the development process. However, all those interviewed in this case agreed
that ultimately political intervention was ineffective in terms of changing the development outcome.
The third issue is the impact of such fast-tracking on citizen perceptions of planning process. The
perceived marginalisation of local government planning processes ultimately contributed to a negative
perception of state government planning. The process was described variously by residents as
‘absolutely objectionable’, ‘offensive’, and ‘an appalling process’. As a resident explains:
What was proposed and ultimately built was actually outside the planning regulations for our
local council and for that site. So our local council, who was voted in by us ostensibly, have
set in train a set of planning schemes that have been agreed to at some level by the local
community. The state government were able to basically override them.
Therefore, while resident opposition did not disrupt housing supply, product cost consequences of
fast-tracking are felt in terms of public perceptions of planning.
While this case made significant gains in affordable housing supply, by by-passing local planning
processes, including notification and opportunities for objection, the process of fast-tracking fuelled
community anger and distrust. Of note in this development is that the residents interviewed were all
broadly supportive of the development’s intent, particularly its innovative sustainability features and
inclusion of social housing. This case illustrates that community response to development is not
always negative, with the removal of TPOAR in order to expedite development assessment in this
case perhaps resulting in a lost opportunity for meaningful participatory planning process..

Proactive Participation
The third and final planning pathway considered is that of proactive participation. While the previous
two pathways discussed have a defined statutory basis in development assessment, here we are
broadening the scope to consider activities that engage community in the development of the planning
policy that frames development assessment. By engaging residents in policy formation, this model is
often presented as a desirable middle road, allowing for resident participation in ‘setting the rules’,
building stakeholder buy-in (Healey 1997), and creating opportunities for conflict resolution between
competing interests (Albrechts 2004). It also potentially limits objections later in the planning process,
or indeed is used as justification for the removal of TPOAR altogether (Productivity Commission 2011).

Case study of proactive participation – Manningham
Our case study of proactive participation is within the LGA of Manningham. Manningham is in the
north-eastern suburbs of Melbourne and is characterised by low density detached dwellings, although
there has been significant attention by the local council on increasing development intensity in the
municipality, particularly around its principle activity district – Doncaster Hill. Manningham is in the
second highest quintile of SEIFA relative advantage, with a more homogenous urban form and
demographic spread than the previous two case study developments. It is a politically conservative
area, with the quantitative data revealing lower rates of objection and appeal relative to other
Melbourne LGAs.
The development site is on a main road within walking distance of Doncaster Hill activity centre with
access to multiple bus services. It is in an area subject to a planning overlay that allows for intensified
development. The introduction of this overlay was the focus of significant community engagement by
the local council. The process of consultation, including significant resident objection, ultimately
concluded with a new overlay (a Design Development Overlay) in the local planning scheme.
The case study development, which in the view of the local council complies with policy, attracted
significant local objection (30 formal objections) and proceeded to VCAT for mediation, despite the
consultative effort of council in the development of the overlay. What emerges from the case study
data is that upfront engagement in planning policy formation does not necessarily reduce community
opposition to individual developments. Several reasons for this are evident. First, from the residents’
perspective, there were deficiencies in the initial community engagement. All residents interviewed
maintained they did not receive the original notification about changes to height controls. Even when
a copy of the letter was produced in interviews, residents did not feel it reflected the potential for
change to their suburb that they were experiencing. The letter, which did not include a map of the
proposed area covered by the overlay, states the amendment will ‘encourage residential densities
around existing Activity Centres and along Main Roads’ (Manningham City Council 2005, p.1)
encouraging three-storey developments on lots of 2000sqm or more and two-storey development on
lots less than 2000sqm. Alternately, in areas ‘removed from Activity Centres and Main Roads, a
maximum of two dwellings is encouraged on a lot’ (Manningham City Council 2005, p.2). Reflecting on
the letter during the interview one resident maintained that ‘even reading it today knowing what it
means, it didn’t scare me’ because ‘at no point did they ever say “We could put 38 apartments on
[your] Street”. This is further complicated by the fact that later adjustments to the overlay reduced the
minimum lot size for 3 story development from 2000m2 to 1633m2, effectively permitting such
development on two standard lots, rather than three. Only those who objected to the original proposal
were informed of this significant change.
Second, and related to the issue of clarity in consultation, are the limitations of residents in
comprehending the implications of policy. As one resident explains, “If we knew the full impact [of the
policy] we would never have renovated our house five years ago”. What the interview data reveals is
that until there is development on the ground, the majority of residents are not aware of the
implications of planning policy, or at least struggle to conceptualise the implications, even when they
have been party to its development. In this case study at least, the implications of planning policy
changes only become real and apparent to residents when there was physical change to their
immediate neighbourhood. Once the full impact of the planning policy was felt, residents mobilised in
opposition.
This case illustrates the difficulty of engaging residents in upfront policy formation where amendments
are played out over several years. This can generate anger and frustration as residents see their
neighbourhoods change, fuelling anti-development campaigns even where councils have been proactive about designating areas for HDH in their planning schemes. Upfront consultation also
generates ongoing demand for robust, clear and locally situated information at subsequent planning
stages. Therefore, in this case study example, the efforts in up-front engagement do not appear to

have reduced the anguish of residents, or reduced the extent of opposition in the development
assessment process.

Conclusions
Planning policy and process plays a critical role in mediating development pressure and community
resistance to change. In the context of compact city, which requires increased development in existing
urban areas, delivering on participatory planning becomes more challenging than usual. Using the
case study of Melbourne, Victoria, we have examined three broad planning pathways that bring
different approaches to mediating this conflict: reactive participation; bypassing participation; and
proactive participation. All three pathways are used within Victoria, and each has relevance to other
jurisdictions nationally and internationally.
Analysis of the reactive participation model of resident participation shows that TPOAR are being used
to target HDH in Victoria, albeit in a context where HDH developments are increasingly bypassing
resident objection and appeal rights. It also reveals that residents are resorting to TPOAR and appeal
hearings to resolve conflict in the absence of strong up-front policy determination. Although relatively
few appeals are lodged by third parties, it is evident that objectors are influencing housing supply by
providing a backdrop of opposition to plans, influencing local council decisions to refuse (or fail to
determine) permit applications. Analysis also reveals a socio-economic bias is prevalent in the use of
TPOAR to contest HDH at the metropolitan scale. While the skew towards higher levels of wealth and
education in engagement with TPOAR is not necessarily a problem, as such engagement might still
be representative of broad community perspectives (Ellis 2002), it is problematic where significant
socio-spatial segregation exists. It would appear from our analysis of Melbourne that TPOAR are
being used in an attempt to protect established lower density neighbourhoods from HDH, an action
that reinforces existing socio-spatial inequalities.
In the case of bypassing TPOAR we have seen that fast-track planning approaches can quickly
increase the supply of housing. However, there are consequences for resident buy-in and perceptions
of planning process. The benefits that might be accrued through fast-tracking HDH in terms of
housing supply need to be weighed up against the loss of public support and faith in planning and
political process, and missed opportunities to develop community-supported affordable housing. While
there is merit in rewarding developers who submit proposals that are clearly in line with transparent
and established policy, developers frequently test the limits of policy intent, suggesting an important
role for TPOAR in allowing community oversight.
When asked which of the three planning approaches they would prefer, most interviewees supported
early consultation at a strategic level. However, our analysis reveals limitations with this proactive
participation model. A key limitation is the ability of residents to connect planning policy developments
with specific implications for their neighbourhood and home. While residents are well aware of the
financial, cultural and practical values of their homes - an awareness that often drives their resistance
to change - they are typically less aware of the relationship between their house/property and land-use
policy and urban restructuring (Cook et al 2013). A second important observation is that proactive
early consultation does not necessarily reduce the appetite or need for resident engagement in
development assessment. In fact it might increase it, as residents become more informed of the
potential impacts of planning policy. Therefore, rather than a means to reduce the need for resident
engagement in development assessment, as is sometimes framed (Productivity Commission 2011),
proactive participation is better viewed in conjunction with other participatory avenues in development
assessment as the basis for more effective participatory planning outcomes. The challenge, once
citizens are engaged in the policy development process, is keeping residents involved in planning
processes, that can extend over a number of years and involve different levels of decision-making,
drafting and ratification.
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